United States: Too Little, Too Late After China

by Michael Passingan

Papua New Guinea and the United States signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on health cooperation in Port Moresby this week. Under the deal, Washington will commit US$15 million (over K60 million) to help PNG prevent and respond to infectious diseases. PNG’s Health Minister welcomed the funding, describing it as a boost to the country’s strained health system and building on existing HIV programs like PEPFAR. On paper, it is a welcome step. In the broader context of Pacific geopolitics, however, it feels like too little, too late especially when measured against China’s long-established and far larger footprint in PNG.⁠Tvwan

China has been playing the long game in PNG for more than two decades. Since PNG became the first Pacific nation to join Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative in 2018, Chinese investment has poured into roads, ports, bridges, hospitals, and stadiums. The scale is staggering: billions in loans, grants, and projects that deliver visible, tangible benefits to ordinary Papua New Guineans. During the COVID-19 pandemic, China’s “Silk Road Ark” medical ship docked and treated thousands of patients. Chinese medical teams have worked in PNG hospitals, and Beijing has supplied vaccines, equipment, and training when local systems were overwhelmed. These health-related gestures sit alongside massive infrastructure spending that indirectly strengthens public health by improving access, water supply, and economic opportunity.⁠YouTube

By contrast, America’s engagement has often felt episodic and security-first. The 2023 Defence Cooperation Agreement and recent fuel storage facility grabbed headlines, but they were framed primarily as countering Chinese influence rather than meeting PNG’s development needs. Health cooperation has lagged. The new US$15 million MOU, while useful for infectious disease surveillance, represents a modest sum relative to PNG’s vast health challenges—HIV prevalence, tuberculosis, malaria, and the lingering effects of the 2024 riots and resource-sector strain. Fifteen million dollars is a fraction of what China has committed across multiple sectors over the same period.

This pattern repeats across the Pacific. Solomon Islands’ 2022 security pact with China sent shockwaves through Washington and Canberra, prompting belated US and Australian offers of aid, embassies, and forums. PNG has so far avoided a formal Chinese security deal, but Prime Minister James Marape has repeatedly stressed “friends to all, enemies to none.” That pragmatic stance reflects economic reality: China is PNG’s largest trading partner and creditor. When Beijing offers loans with fewer strings and faster delivery, it wins friends. When Washington arrives late with smaller, narrowly targeted packages, it looks reactive.

Critics will argue that US aid comes without the debt-trap risks or governance concerns sometimes attached to Chinese lending. That is a fair point. Yet perception matters in Port Moresby and across the islands. Ordinary citizens see Chinese-built roads they drive on daily and Chinese-funded clinics in their provinces. A new US health MOU announced in English from a Port Moresby hotel conference room does not carry the same immediate resonance.

Washington’s renewed Pacific focus is overdue and necessary. The Biden-era initiatives, continued under subsequent administrations, have increased diplomatic presence and funding. But playing catch-up after China has spent years embedding itself in PNG’s economy and infrastructure risks reinforcing the very narrative Beijing promotes: that China is the reliable partner, while the US shows up only when strategically alarmed.

If the United States truly wants to be a partner of choice in PNG, it must move beyond modest health MOUs and security pacts. It needs sustained, large-scale, visible investment in the areas PNG cares about most health, education, roads, and climate resilience delivered at speed and scale that matches or exceeds Beijing’s. Otherwise, Friday’s MOU will be remembered not as a breakthrough, but as another belated footnote in the story of America arriving too little, too late after China.